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Abstract
We show that a large class of data-ﬂow analyses for imperative languages are describable as type systems in the following technical
sense: possible results of an analysis can be described in a language of types so that a program checks with a type if and only if
this type is a supertype of the result of applying the analysis. Type-checking is easy with the help of a certiﬁcate that records
the “eureka”-bits of a typing derivation. Certiﬁcate-assisted type-checking amounts to a form of lightweight analysis à la Rose.
For secure information ﬂow, we obtain a type system that is considerably more precise than that of Volpano et al., but not more
sophisticated. Importantly, our type systems are compositional.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Both program analyses and type systems can be used to infer and state properties of programs. Clearly, program
analyses are more algorithmic by their nature while type systems are more declarative. In particular, although program
analyses are convenient tools for inferring properties of programs, type systems have advantages over them, when it
comes to communicating the properties established.
Given these considerations, it is most natural to wish to relate program analyses and type systems. This idea has
been around for quite some time. In particular, Cousot has shown that both are instances of abstract interpretation [6]
and there are several works describing how to derive type systems from program analysis deﬁnitions [17,13]. But the
project has not been carried out really satisfactorily for imperative languages. The main obstacle seems to have been a
confusion over what a type system for an imperative language should look like.
In this paper, we tackle exactly the problem of deriving type systems from analyses for imperative languages (more
speciﬁcally, data-ﬂow analyses) and solve it based on a simple philosophical idea of what types are all about. Our
position is that a type must always be an abstraction of the denotation of a program, be it then an abstraction of its
denotation with respect to the standard semantics of language or some non-standard semantics. And a type system
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must be a compositional way of ascribing types to programs such that type-checking is “easy” (and type inference “not
too hard”, preferably). Since imperative programs denote transformations of (standard or non-standard) states—a state
before a run of the program is sent to the state after it—, types for imperative programs must be implications between
abstractions of (standard or non-standard) states, i.e., pairs of abstract states. (Compare this to Hoare logic, which is
based on one instance of this idea: “types” of programs are implications between predicates on states in the sense that,
for any legal prestate–poststate pair, if the prestate satisﬁes the antecedent predicate, then the poststate satisﬁes the
succedent predicate). We show that this quite basic idea leads to very simple type systems with smooth meta-theory
which, we hope, will ﬁnd applications in the area of certiﬁed software.
Our approach is in strong contrast to works where authors have chosen types for imperative programs to be single
abstract states, e.g., the classic work by Volpano et al. on secure information ﬂow [22], where the type of a program
is an assignment of invariant security classes to its variables. They may have drawn their intuitions from the fact that,
in many languages, the data-types of the variables of a program are required to stay invariant during its runs. But
data-types and languages where variables cannot migrate from one data-type to another are more of an exception than
a rule in the big picture of imperative languages and notions of abstract state. Most kinds of abstract states or types
(such as which variables are live etc.) do change during runs. Because of the better notion of type, our type systems
allow us to infer and state sharper properties of programs than type systems based on the idea that a type is a single
abstract state.
More technically, our achievement and contribution in this paper is the following. We introduce a framework for
deﬁning data-ﬂow analyses that caters, besides the most classical data-ﬂow analyses such as available expressions or
very busy expressions, also abstract interpretation inspired analyses such as constant propagation, and analyses based
on non-standard semantics of conditional constructs such as secure information ﬂow. We then introduce a method for
deriving a type system from an analysis deﬁned in the framework and show that the type system obtained is always
equivalent to the analysis. What the method does is very simple: in fact we only introduce two schematic type systems,
one for all forward may-analyses and one for all backward must-analyses deﬁnable in the framework. This does not
restrict generality, since any forwardmust-analysis (resp. backwardmay-analysis) is trivially turned into a forwardmay-
analysis (resp. backward must-analysis) by reversing the partial order of the abstract state space of the analysis. A type
system for a concrete analysis is obtained by mechanical instantiation of the appropriate schematic type system with the
deﬁnition of the analysis. We look at a number of example analyses, most prominently secure information ﬂow. We also
discuss extraction of certiﬁcates (essential information) from typing derivations and lightweight, certiﬁcate-assisted
type-checking that should be useful in the venture of certiﬁed code.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our framework for deﬁning data-ﬂow analyses.
In Section 3, we present our method of deriving a type system from the deﬁnition of an analysis. In Section 4, we
substantiate our development with examples. In Section 5, we discuss certiﬁcate generation from type derivations and
certiﬁcate-assisted type-checking. Section 6 overviews the related work and Section 7 presents our conclusions.
2. A framework for data-ﬂow analyses
We consider a simple imperative programming language (While-language). Its statements (or, programs) are given
by the following grammar:
P ::= p | P1;P2 | if b then P1 else P2 | while b do P1.
Here p is a primitive statement and b a Boolean expression (whose evaluation does not change the state of the program),
similar to [13]. Primitive statements may be assignments or skip-statements; their details do not concern us here.
Let Stm be the set of all programs.
Data-ﬂow analyses work by calculating an assignment of abstract states to the edges of a control-ﬂow graph.
Depending on whether the analysis is forward or backward, either the direct or inverse control-ﬂow graph of a given
program is used and the calculation happens by propagating abstract states across the nodes of the graph in the
appropriate direction.
We consider two types of data-ﬂow analyses: forward may-analyses (based on least ﬁxedpoint computation on the
direct control-ﬂow graph of a program) and backward must-analyses (based on greatest ﬁxedpoint computation on the
inverse control-ﬂow diagram). The reasons to choose these two kinds as primitive will be explained in the next section.
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Fig. 1. Schematic control-ﬂow graph G?
P
of a program P for forward may-analyses.
Forward must-analyses and backward may-analyses are variants obtained by reversing the partial order on the abstract
state space.
Both types of analyses proceed from an abstract state space (D,) that is a partial order. For forward may-analyses,
we require furthermore that (D,) is an -complete upper semilattice, i.e.
• any two elements d, d ′ have a least upper bound d unionsq d ′;
• any chain {dn}n∈N, where dn ∈ D and dn  dn+1 for all n ∈ N, has a least upper bound⊔n∈N dn.
We assume that each primitive statement p is given a denotation p : D → D (sending an abstract state before running
p to the abstract state after). The function p must be monotone and upward -continuous. Also, two denotations
bt, bf : D → D are associated with each boolean expression b. If d is an abstract state before evaluating b, then
bt(d) [resp. bf(d)] correspond to the abstract states after evaluating to true, resp. false. After evaluating b the result
of the evaluation is known and these denotations can add that knowledge to their arguments. The functions bt and
bf must be monotone and upward -continuous as well. Often they are also reductive (i.e., bt(d), bf(d)  d).
For backward must-analyses, the abstract state space (D,) must be an -complete lower semilattice. Again we
must have functions p, bt, bf : D → D, this time sending an abstract state after running p or evaluating b to
true or false to the abstract state before. All these must be monotone and downward -continuous.
A control-ﬂow graph G is always a tuple (V , ar, , E, ei, ef , , ) where V is a set of nodes, ar : V → N gives
the indegree of a node (the number of incoming edges),  : (v : V ) → (Dar(v) → D) maps a node to a corresponding
transfer function,E is a set of edges, ei, ef ∈ E are two distinguished edges called the initial and ﬁnal edge, respectively,
 : E\{ei} → V gives the source node of an edge and  : E\{ef} → V × N gives the target node of an edge together
with its sequence number among the incoming edges of that node. Note that the initial edge does not have a source and
the ﬁnal edge does not have a target. The function  is injective—merging of abstract values may only be done by the
transfer functions. Hence there exists an inverse partial function −1 : V × N ⇀ E\{ef}.
The direct and inverse control-ﬂow graphs G?P and G
>
P of a program P are deﬁned inductively over the structure of
P, the deﬁnitions are given in Figs. 1 and 2. The sets of nodes and edges, as well as the mappings ar,  and  and the
edges ei and ef are presented there in a straightforward manner. The transfer functions are depicted inside the nodes; id
denotes the identity function on D (and is only there, because it is convenient if every control-ﬂow graph has a unique
initial edge, just as we have required). The incoming edges of a node are numbered from top to bottom.
We see that in addition to the transfer functions p, bt, bf and unionsq/, given by the semantics of primitive
constructs or the lattice D itself, the control-ﬂow graph also requires certain semantic functions branch : D → D and
combine : D×D → D; they must also be monotone and upwards (for forward analyses) or downwards (for backwards
analyses)-continuous. The nodes labeled with branch and combine are used to inform the program analysis about the
control dependencies of the nodes in the control-ﬂow graph; this information is necessary for some kinds of analyses.
If the goal of an analysis is to determine the properties of program points (all kinds of value analyses are in this class),
then the nodes labeled with branch and combine are not really necessary. Simple joining of abstract states coming
from different branches sufﬁces because, at the conﬂuence point, we have to take the disjunction of the properties on
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Fig. 2. Schematic control-ﬂow graph G>
P
of a program P for backward must-analyses.
branches and this corresponds to the join on D. The situation is the same for the analyses that attempt to determine
the properties of program paths (for example, where certain variables are used or deﬁned)—disjunction (or join) has
to be taken at conﬂuence points. In such cases, branch may simply be the identity function and combine the second
projection.
However, there are some analyses, most notably analyses for information ﬂow, that do not belong to either class.
These analyses do not attempt to ﬁnd properties, but to make sure that all program runs are somehow similar (and
to ﬁnd the level of similarity). In principle, we want to ﬁnd the most precise equivalence relation from a given set
of equivalence relations over program runs, such that it relates any two runs that are possible for the given program.
If some equivalence relation is suitable for one set of program runs (say, all runs over a certain program path), and
the same equivalence relation is also suitable for some other set of program runs (all runs over some other program
path), then this is not yet sufﬁcient for a run from the ﬁrst set and a run from the second set to be related. Some extra
processing is necessary when merging those paths and we have found that a form of pre- and post-processing given by
Figs. 1 and 2 sufﬁces for the examples that we are going to present. We believe that this form is sufﬁciently general
and covers more-or-less every program analysis that we may want to execute. The combine-functions have appeared
before in CFG-based analyses for secure information ﬂow [11,12].
The post-processing function combine is given some extra information about the state before running the branches.
This control-ﬂow graph edge from before the branches to combine does not really make the framework any more
powerful, as the same information could be propagated through the branches by suitably modifying the domain D. But
this modiﬁcation may overly complicate the domain and the transfer functions.
Abstract denotations are associated with arbitrary programs by a forward or a backward analysis in the following
way. For any control graph G, we deﬁne a functional G : D → ((E → D) → (E → D)) by
G(d)()(e) =
{
d, if e = ei,
(v)((e1), . . . , (ear(v))), otherwise,
where v = (e) and ei = −1(v, i).
The abstract denotation P ? : D → D of a program P deﬁned by a forward analysis is P ?(d) = lfp(G?P (d))
(ef
G
?
P
), where the least ﬁxedpoint exists since E → D is an -complete upper semilattice and 
G
?
P
(d) is upward
-continuous. P ? is easily veriﬁed to be monotone and upward -continuous.
The abstract denotation P > : D → D assigned by a backward analysis to a program P is P >(d) =
gfp(
G
>
P
(d))(ef
G
>
P
); the greatest ﬁxedpoint exists since E → D is an -complete lower semilattice and 
G
>
P
(d)
is downward -continuous. P > : D → D is also monotone and downward -continuous.
As next we state some lemmas about the intermediate results of computing the least or greatest ﬁxed points ofG(d);
these lemmas are needed in the next section. These lemmas basically say that the when we compute the ﬁxed point of
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G(d) then we are also computing the ﬁxed points of G′(d ′) where G′ is a subgraph of G and d ′ is the is the abstract
value on the initial edge of G′. Hence these lemmas expose the compositionality in the computation of lfp(G(d)).
We concentrate on the case where D is an -complete upper semilattice and the primitive semantic functions are
all monotone and upward continuous. That is, we concentrate on P ?; the results for P > are analogous. For a
control-ﬂow graph G and a mapping  : E → D we deﬁne the mappings ↑Gi : E → D by
∀e ∈ E : ↑G0 (e) = ⊥, ∀i ∈ N : ↑Gi+1 = G(d)(↑Gi ).
We have ↑Gi  ↑Gj whenever ij becauseG(d) is monotone and ↑G0  ↑G1 . The join operation unionsq on D is extended
pointwise to mappings from E to D.
Lemma 1 (Kleene’s ﬁxed point theorem). lfp(G(d)) =⊔i∈N ↑Gi .
Also, for a mapping  : E → D deﬁne the mappings ↑Gi by
↑G0 = , ∀i ∈ N : ↑Gi+1 = ↑Gi unionsq G(d)(↑Gi )
and let lfp(G(d)) = ⊔i∈N ↑Gi ; this join exists because of -completeness of D. By Lemma 1, lfp(G(d)) =
lfpe.⊥(G(d)).
Lemma 2. Let , ′ : E → D be such that   ′  lfp(G(d)). Then lfp(G(d)) = lfp′(G(d)).
Proof. For all i ∈ N we have
↑Gi  
′↑G
i  lfp(G(d)),
this follows trivially from the monotonicity of G(d) and the deﬁnition of the ﬁxed points. Taking the joins over all i
gives us
lfp(G(d))  lfp′(G(d))  lfp(G(d)),
giving us the equality of least ﬁxed points. 
Lemma 3. Let G?P be the control-ﬂow graph of a program P, let P ′ be a syntactic subprogram of P and let G
?
P ′
be a subgraph of G?P that is the control-ﬂow graph of P ′. The initial and ﬁnal edges ei
G
?
P ′
and ef
G
?
P ′
are also edges
of G?P . Let E′ be the set of edges of G
?
P ′ . Let i ∈ N be ﬁxed. Let i : E′ → D be the restriction of 
↑G?P
i to E
′
.
Let dˆ = ↑G
?
P
i (e
i
G
?
P ′
) Then
i  lfp(
G
?
P ′
(dˆ)). (1)
Proof. Deﬁne the mappings ˆj : E′ → D by
∀e ∈ E′ : ˆ0 = ⊥, ∀j ∈ N : ˆj+1 = 
G
?
P ′
(dˆ)(ˆj ). (2)
By induction over j, we show that j  ˆj for all j i. If j = 0 then 0 = ˆ0 = e.⊥. If j > 0 then
ˆj (e
i
G
?
P ′
) = dˆ = ↑G
?
P
i (e
i
G
?
P ′
)  ↑G
?
P
j (e
i
G
?
P ′
) = j (ei
G
?
P ′
).
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If e ∈ E′\{ei
G
?
P ′
} then let v be the source node of e and let e1, . . . , ek be the incoming edges of v. The edges e1, . . . , ek
also belong to E′. We have
ˆj (e) = (v)(ˆj−1(e1), . . . , ˆj−1(ek))  (v)(j−1(e1), . . . , j−1(ek)) = j (e),
where the inequality is by the induction assumption and monotonicity of (v). Finally, we get (1) from
i  ˆi  ⊔
j∈N
ˆj = lfp(
G
?
P ′
(dˆ)),
where the last inequality comes from Lemma 1. 
Corollary 4. With the same notations as in Lemma 3, we have
P ′?(
↑G?P
i (e
i
G
?
P ′
))  ↑G
?
P
i (e
f
G
?
P ′
). (3)
Proof. Inequation (3) is obtained by applying the mappings in (1) to ef
G
?
P ′
. 
Lemma 5. Let v be a node in a control-ﬂow graph G. Let e1, . . . , ear(v) be the incoming edges of v (i.e. (ej ) = (v, j))
and let e be the outgoing edge of v (i.e. (e) = v). Then (v)(↑Gi (e1), . . . , ↑Gi (ear(v)))  ↑Gi (e) for all i ∈ N.
Proof. (v)(↑Gi (e1), . . . , 
↑G
i (ear(v))) = ↑Gi+1(e)  ↑Gi (e). 
Lemma 6. With the same notations as in Lemma 3, we have
P ′?(lfp(G?P (d))(e
i
G
?
P ′
)) = lfp(
G
?
P
(d))(ef
G
?
P ′
). (4)
Proof. The inequation “” in (4) can be obtained by taking the join over all i ∈ N in (3). To demonstrate the inequation
“” deﬁne the mappings ˆj : E′ → D as in (2) where we take dˆ = lfp(
G
?
P
(d))(ei
G
?
P ′
). By induction on j we can show
that ˆj (e)  lfp(
G
?
P
(d))(e), for all e ∈ E′. Indeed, ˆ0(e) = ⊥ for all e, this establishes the basis of the induction.
If j > 0 and e = ei
G
?
P ′
then ˆj (e) = dˆ = lfp(
G
?
P
(d))(e). If e ∈ E′\{ei
G
?
P ′
} then let v be the source of e and e1, . . . , ek
be the incoming edges of v; the edges e1, . . . , ek also belong to E′. We have
ˆj (e) = (v)(ˆj−1(e1), . . . , ˆj−1(ek))  (v)(lfp(
G
?
P
(d))(e1), . . . , lfp(
G
?
P
(d))(ek)) = lfp(
G
?
P
(d))(e),
where the inequation comes from the induction assumption and the last equation from the properties of ﬁxed points.
Taking the join over all j gives us
lfp(
G
?
P ′
(dˆ))(e) = ⊔
j∈N
ˆj (e)  lfp(
G
?
P
(d))(e)
for all e ∈ E′. This is the inequation “” in (4) for e = ef
G
?
P ′
. 
3. Type systems
We are now ready to proceed to our type systems. We present a schematic type system for both forward and backward
analyses. Type systems for concrete analyses are obtained as instances.
In both cases, types are of the form d1 −→ d2 where d1, d2 ∈ D, reﬂecting the idea that denotations of programs are
transformers of (standard or non-standard) states. The intended meaning of a typing judgement P : d1 −→ d2 is that
if the state before running P can be described by d1, then the state after is described by d2. This is independent of the
direction of the analysis, i.e., the implication sign in the type always indicates the direction of running the program.
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Fig. 3. Schematic type system corresponding to forward may-analyses.
Also in both cases, the type system is extracted from the deﬁnition of control-ﬂow graphs for programs. The typing
rule for each statement-construct is read off from the corresponding clause in the deﬁnition of control-ﬂow graphs. The
rule (sub) is a subsumption rule combining the usual subsumption rule with structural subtyping for implications.
The type system derived from a forward analysis is presented in Fig. 3. All rules, except (while), are self-explanatory.
In (while), d ′ is a form of a loop invariant—it corresponds to the abstract state at the back-edge in the direct control-ﬂow
graph of the while-statement. The normal use of the type system for analyzing a program is this: given a program P
and an abstract state d, ﬁnd an abstract state d ′ such that P : d −→ d ′. Inspecting the rule set, one can see that the
process is immediate except for two aspects: (1) it is not a priori clear if and when it is necessary to apply (sub) and (2)
applying (while) takes guessing a suitable invariant.
The type system is equivalent to the inducing analysis in the sense of the following theorem.
Theorem 7. For any P ∈ Stm and d1, d2 ∈ D it holds that ? P : d1 −→ d2 iff P ?(d1)  d2.
Proof. Both directions are proved by induction over the structure of the program P; or over the derivation tree of
? P : d1 −→ d2, which is equivalent.
Consider the ‘only if’ direction ﬁrst. Let P be a program such that ? P : d1 −→ d2 holds. Consider the last rule
that was applied to derive ? P : d1 −→ d2.
If the rule was (sub) then we also have ? P : d ′1 −→ d ′2 for some d ′1  d1 and d ′2  d2. Hence we have
P ?(d1)  P ?(d ′1)  d ′2  d2,
where the ﬁrst inequality is given by the monotonicity of P ? and the second by the induction hypothesis applied to
? P : d ′1 −→ d ′2.
If the last rule was (prim) then P is a primitive statement p. We have d1 = d and d2 = p(d) = P ?(d1) for
some d ∈ D.
If the last rule was (seq) then P is of the form P1;P2. Also, there exists d ′ ∈ D, such that ? P1 : d1 −→ d ′ and
? P2 : d ′ −→ d2. The induction hypothesis gives us P1?(d1)  d ′ and P2?(d ′)  d2. Consider the computation
of lfp(
G
?
P
(d1)); let 
↑G?P
i be deﬁned as in the end of Section 2. Let e be the edge in G
?
P that is between G
?
P1
and G?P2 .
Let i1. Corollary 4, when applied to the subprogram P1, gives us

↑G?P
i (e)  P1?(
↑G?P
i (e
i)) = P1?(d1)  d ′.
Applying Corollary 4 to the subprogram P2 gives

↑G?P
i (e
f)  P2?(↑G
?
P
i (e))  P2?(d ′)  d2.
Hence by Lemma 1, P ?(d1) = lfp(G?P (d1))(e
f)  d2.
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If the last rule that was applied to derive ? P : d1 −→ d2 was (if) then P is of the form if b then P1 else P2. Let us
give the following names to the following edges in G?P (see Fig. 1):• e1a and e2a are the edges from the node labeled with branch to the nodes labeled with bt and bf, respectively;
• e1b [resp. e2b] is the initial edge of G?P1 [resp. G
?
P2
];
• e1c [resp. e2c] is the ﬁnal edge of G?P1 [resp. G
?
P2
];
• e3 [resp. e4] is the edge from the node labeled with unionsq [resp id] to the node labeled with combine.
The induction hypothesis gives us P1?(bt(branch(d)))  d ′ and
P2?(bf(branch(d)))  d ′. Let i1. Using Lemma 5 and Corollary 4, as well as the induction hypothesis and the
monotonicity of semantic functions, we can derive

↑G?P
i (e
f)  combine(↑G
?
P
i (e4), 
↑G?P
i (e3))
 combine(d, ↑G
?
P
i (e1c) unionsq 
↑G?P
i (e2c))
 combine(d, P1?(↑G
?
P
i (e1b)) unionsq P2?(
↑G?P
i (e2b)))
 combine(d, P1?(bt(↑G
?
P
i (e1a))) unionsq P2?(bf(
↑G?P
i (e2a))))
 combine(d, P1?(bt(branch(d))) unionsq P2?(bf(branch(d))))
 combine(d, d ′ unionsq d ′) = combine(d, d ′).
Hence by Lemma 1, P ?(d) = lfp(G?P (d))(e
f)  combine(d, d ′).
If the last rule that was applied to derive ? P : d1 −→ d2 was (while) then P is of the form while b do P1. Let us
give the following names to the following edges in G?P (see Fig. 1):• e1 [resp. e2; e5; e6; e7] is the edge from the node labeled with branch [resp. unionsq; unionsq; bf; id] to the node labeled with
unionsq [resp. bt; bf; combine; combine];
• e3 [resp. e4] is the initial [resp. ﬁnal] edge of G?P1 .
According to the rule (while) and the induction assumption there exists d ′ ∈ D, such that branch(d)  d ′ and
P1?(bt(d
′))  d ′. Using mathematical induction over i, we show that for all i ∈ N, ↑G
?
P
i (e4)  d ′. Indeed,

↑G?P
0 (e4) = ⊥ and

↑G?P
i+1 (e4)  P1?(bt(
↑G?P
i+1 (e2)))
= P1?(bt(↑G
?
P
i (e1) unionsq 
↑G?P
i (e4)))
 P1?(bt(branch(d) unionsq d ′)) = P1?(bt(d ′))  d ′,
here we have besides the induction assumption ↑G
?
P
i (e4)  d ′ also used Lemma 5 and Corollary 4.
Let i1. Using Lemma 5 and Corollary 4, as well as the induction hypothesis and the monotonicity of semantic
functions, we can derive

↑G?P
i (e
f)  combine(↑G
?
P
i (e7), 
↑G?P
i (e6))
 combine(d, bf(↑G
?
P
i (e5)))
 combine(d, bf(↑G
?
P
i (e1) unionsq 
↑G?P
i (e4)))
 combine(d, bf(branch(d) unionsq d ′)) = combine(d, bf(d ′)).
Hence by Lemma 1, P ?(d) = lfp(G?P (d))(e
f)  combine(d, bf(d ′)).
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Fig. 4. Schematic type system corresponding to backward must-analyses.
For showing the ‘if’ direction, let P be a program and d ∈ D. We show that ? P : d −→ P ?(d); the claim of
the theorem in its full generality is then obtained by applying the typing rule (sub).
If P is a primitive statement p then we have ? p : d −→ p(d) by the rule (prim). Also, p?(d) = p(d).
If P is P1;P2 then let d ′′ = P ?(d) and let e be the edge of G?P that connects G
?
P1
and G?P2 . Let d
′ =
lfp(
G
?
P
(d))(e). Applying Lemma 6 to P1 and P2 we get P1?(d) = d ′ and P2?(d ′) = d ′′. By the induc-
tion assumption, we can derive ? P1 : d −→ d ′ and ? P2 : d ′ −→ d ′′. These derivations together with an application
of the rule (seq) give us the necessary derivation for P.
If P is if b then P1 else P2 then let certain edges in G?P be given the same names as in the proof for if-direction.
For such named edge ex let dx = lfp(
G
?
P
(d))(ex). We have d1a = d2a = branch(d), d1b = bt(branch(d)), d2b =
bf(branch(d)) by the properties of ﬁxed points; d1c = P1?(bt(branch(d))), d2c = P2?(bf(branch(d)))
by Lemma 6; P ?(d) = combine(d, d1c unionsq d2c). Let d ′ = d1c unionsq d2c. By induction assumption we derive ? P1 :
bt(branch(d)) −→ d1c and ? P2 : bf(branch(d)) −→ d2c. Using the typing rule (sub) we can derive ? P1 :
bt(branch(d)) −→ d ′ and ? P2 : bf(branch(d)) −→ d ′. These derivations together with an application of the
rule (if) give us the necessary derivation for P.
If P is while b do P1 then let certain edges in G
?
P be given the same names as in the proof for if-direction.
Deﬁne the values dx as above. Let d ′ = d2. Then branch(d)  d ′ because d ′ = branch(d) unionsq d4. By Lemma 6,
P1?(bt(d
′)) = d4. Hence, by induction assumption, we can derive ? P1 : bt(d ′) −→ d4 and, using the rule
(sub), also ? P1 : bt(d ′) −→ d ′. By the properties of ﬁxed points we have P ?(d) = combine(d, bf(d ′)) and
the corresponding type can be derived with the help of the rule (while). 
We see that, given an initial abstract state, the type system can approve as ﬁnal any abstract state that is weaker
(containing more concrete states) than the ﬁnal abstract state computed by the analysis. The analysis gives the strongest
(smallest) postcondition of a precondition, whereas the type system accepts any postcondition.
The type system corresponding to backward analyses is given in Fig. 4. (Remember that the direction of the arrow
still indicates the direction of running the program.) The rules are different, since inverse control-ﬂow graphs differ
from direct ones. But the ideas are still exactly the same. Here the loop invariant d ′ corresponds to the abstract state at
the back-edge of the inverse control-ﬂow graph of the while-statement. The normal use of the type system to analyze
a program is this: given a program P and an abstract state d, ﬁnd an abstract state d ′ such that P : d ′ −→ d.
Again we have a perfect match between the type system and the analysis; the proof is the same as in the forward
case:
Theorem 8. For any P ∈ Stm and d1, d2 ∈ D it holds that > P : d1 −→ d2 iff d1  P >(d2).
Here the type system can identify as initial any abstract state that is stronger than the initial state computed by
the analysis. While the analysis delivers the weakest precondition of a postcondition, the type system approves any
precondition.
It is now also clear why we wanted forward analyses to be “may” and backward analyses to be “must”: this gives
the subsumption rules their normal shape: the implication construct is covariant in its succedent and contravariant in
the antecedent and not the other way around.
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4. Examples
To demonstrate the generality of the framework given in Section 2 and the mechanics of our type systems, we now
show how some concrete data-ﬂow analyses can be expressed within it and discuss the type systems that our method
delivers for them. We present the analyses for constant propagation, very busy expressions, and secure information
ﬂow. And we show even Hoare logic to be an instance of our framework.
In the examples below,we assume that the programming language is deﬁned over a supplyVar of arithmetic variables,
that primitive statements p have the form x := aop(x1, . . . , xk) where x, x1, . . . , xk ∈ Var and aop is an arithmetic
operator with arity k, and Boolean expressions have the form bop(x1, . . . , xk) where bop is an Boolean operator with
arity k. In the following, we let o range over both aop and bop.
4.1. Constant propagation
Constant propagation is a forward may-analysis. The aim is to determine for all program points the values of as
many variables as possible. In the context of type systems, we are given the initial values of some variables and want
to determine the ﬁnal values of as many variables as possible.
Let Z = Z ∪˙ {}, where  is the largest element and other elements are incomparable. The abstract state space
D for constant propagation is (Var → Z)⊥, where X⊥ denotes the set X ∪˙ {⊥} with ⊥ the smallest element and all
other elements ordered in the same way as in X, and the order on Var → Z is deﬁned pointwise.
The analysis works in the forward direction. For ease of exposition, let aop ∈ Z ∪ {+,×} and bop ∈ { ,=}. Here
the elements of Z are nullary operators and the rest are binary. If d = ⊥ then x := o(x1, . . . , xk)(d) = ⊥ and
o(x1, . . . , xk)t(d) = o(x1, . . . , xk)f(d) = ⊥. Otherwise
x := n(d) = d[x → n],
x := y + z(d) =
{
d[x → d(y) + d(z)], d(y), d(z) ∈ Z,
d[x → ], otherwise,
x := y × z(d) =
⎧⎨
⎩
d[x → 0], d(y) = 0 or d(z) = 0,
d[x → d(y) · d(z)], d(y), d(z) ∈ Z\{0},
d[x → ], otherwise,
xyt(d) =
{⊥, d(x), d(y) ∈ Z and d(x) > d(y),
d, otherwise,
xyf(d) =
{⊥, d(x), d(y) ∈ Z and d(x)d(y),
d, otherwise,
x = yt(d) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
⊥, d(x), d(y) ∈ Z and d(x) = d(y),
d[x → d(y)], d(y) ∈ Z and d(x) = ,
d[y → d(x)], d(x) ∈ Z and d(y) = ,
d, otherwise,
x = yf(d) =
{⊥, d(x), d(y) ∈ Z and d(x) = d(y),
d, otherwise.
Finally, branch(d) = d and combine(d, d ′) = d ′. The corresponding type system is given in Fig. 5. Fig. 5 may seem
quite different from Fig. 3 but in reality this is not so. The denotations of primitive statements and boolean expressions
are deﬁned through case analysis. We have chosen to present the different cases as different rules. We could have
presented single rules for primitive statements, if-statements and while-statements by directly following Fig. 3, thus
obtaining the same ﬁve rules as in Fig. 3, but then the case analysis would have been present in these rules, making
them quite unreadable. Also, in some rules for if- and while-statements we have left out some premises of the form
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Fig. 5. Type system from constant propagation analysis.
? P : ⊥ −→ d. The reason is, that a premise in this form is always true. Indeed, ? P : ⊥ −→ ⊥ can be easily
inferred for any P ∈ Stm.
We stress that this “tweaking” of rules in Fig. 5 in comparison with the general rules in Fig. 3 is not inherently
necessary but is done solely for presentation here. We want to show that intuitive data-ﬂow analyses lead to type
systems whose rules correspond to our intuition, too.
4.2. Very busy expressions
Very busy expressions [16] is a backward must-analysis. The aim of this analysis is to determine, for each program
point, which expressions will certainly be computed after the execution has passed that point and before any of the
variables in these expressions are redeﬁned. The results of this analysis may be used to decide whether it is worthwhile
to precompute some expressions.
Let Exp be the set of all expressions, i.e. terms o(x1, . . . , xk). The underlying lattice D for very busy expressions
analysis is P(Exp) (the set of all subsets of Exp) with the natural order. For each x ∈ Var let Expx ⊆ Exp be the set
of all these expressions that contain x. The analysis works in the backward direction. We deﬁne
x := o(x1, . . . , xk)(d) = (d\Expx) ∪ {o(x1, . . . , xk)}
o(x1, . . . , xk)t(d) = o(x1, . . . , xk)f(d) = d ∪ {o(x1, . . . , xk)},
branch(d) = d and combine(d, d ′) = d ′. This gives us the analysis in [16]. The equivalent type system is given
in Fig. 6.
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Fig. 6. Type system from very busy expressions analysis.
4.3. Secure information ﬂow
Next we turn to secure information ﬂow. The classical secure information ﬂow analysis in the spirit of Denning and
Denning [7] is a forward may-analysis. Let L = (L,∨,∧, 1, 0) be a ﬁnite lattice of security classes for variables. The
goal of the analysis is to verify that the initial value of some variable x may only affect the ﬁnal value of a variable y if
the ﬁnal security class of y is at least as great as the initial security class of x.
Let Var′ = Var ∪˙ {pc}. The abstract state space D of the analysis is Var′ → L where the ordering is deﬁned
pointwise. Given d ∈ D describing the security classes at the start of the program the program analysis attempts to ﬁnd
for each variable the security class that bounds from above the information that may ﬂow to its ﬁnal value. The security
class d(pc) contains an upper bound on the information that was used to make the decisions (at branching points)
that caused the execution to reach the current program point; d(pc) should be equal to 0 at the start of the program.
The notation pc is a mnemonic for “program counter”.
The analysis works in the forward direction. The semantics of statements and expressions is deﬁned by
x := o(x1, . . . , xk)(d) = d[x → d(x1) ∨ · · · ∨ d(xk) ∨ d(pc)],
o(x1, . . . , xk)t(d) = o(x1, . . . , xk)f(d) = d[pc → d(x1) ∨ · · · ∨ d(xk) ∨ d(pc)].
That is, the security level of the affected quantity (a variable or the program counter) is updated with the join of security
levels of affecting quantities.
We see that the explicit ﬂows in the program (assigning a variable to another) are handled directly by the analysis.
The implicit ﬂows (one variable controlling whether something is assigned to another one) are handled by increasing
of the security class of the program counter. At the points where the conditional statements end, the combine-function
restores the security class of pc to the one before the conditional statement: combine(d, d ′) = d ′[pc → d(pc)].
The branch-function is just the identity mapping.
The resulting type system is given in Fig. 7. Actually, if we followed Fig. 3 to the letter, then we would have had the
following rule for while:
? P : d ′[pc → d ′(x1) ∨ · · · ∨ d ′(xk) ∨ d ′(pc)] −→ d ′ d  d ′
? while o(x1, . . . , xk) do P : d −→ d ′[pc → d(pc)] (5)
(in the conclusion both o(x1, . . . , xk)f and combine change the value of d ′(pc) but combine is the last one). To get
the rule (while) in Fig. 7, we replace d ′ to the right of the arrow in the premise of (5) with d ′[pc → d ′(x1) ∨ · · · ∨
d ′(xk)∨ d ′(pc)] which we can then rename into d ′ on both sides of the arrow. But now the new d ′ cannot be arbitrary:
d ′(pc) must be at least d ′(xi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The rule (5) and the modiﬁed rule (while) of Fig. 7 are mutually
derivable. Indeed, we can derive (while) from (5) by
∀ i : d ′(xi)d ′(pc)
d ′[pc → d ′(x1) ∨ · · · ∨ d ′(xk) ∨ d ′(pc)] = d ′ ? P : d ′ −→ d ′
? P : d ′[pc → d ′(x1) ∨ · · · ∨ d ′(xk) ∨ d ′(pc)] −→ d ′ (sub) d  d ′
? while o(x1, . . . , xk) do P : d −→ d ′[pc → d(pc)] (5).
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Fig. 7. Type system from forward information ﬂow analysis.
Denote d ′′ = d ′[pc → d ′(x1)∨ · · · ∨ d ′(xk)∨ d ′(pc)]; then ∀i : d ′′(xi)d ′′(pc) and d ′  d ′′. We can derive (5) from
(while) by ﬁrst deriving
? P : d ′′ −→ d ′ d ′  d ′′
? P : d ′′ −→ d ′′ (sub)
d  d ′ d ′  d ′′
d  d ′′ ∀i : d ′′(xi)d ′′(pc)
? while o(x1, . . . , xk) do P : d −→ d ′′[pc → d(pc)] (while)
and then using the equality d ′′[pc → d(pc)] = d ′[pc → d(pc)] to the right of the arrow in the conclusion of this
derivation (technically, this is also an application of the rule (sub)).
4.4. A backward secure information ﬂow analysis
We now look at an alternative secure information ﬂow analysis, which is backward and must. The abstract state space
D of this analysis is the same as that of the forwards analysis just considered. Given d ∈ D describing the security
classes at the end of the program the program analysis attempts to ﬁnd for each variable the maximum initial security
class, such that the initial value of that variable does not ﬂow to the ﬁnal value of any variable with a lower security
class. The security class d(pc) holds a similar upper bound for the decisions inﬂuencing whether an assignment to a
variable is executed or not; it should equal 1 at the end of the program (i.e. at the beginning of the analysis).
Let us deﬁne an auxiliary function la : P(Var′) × D × L → D by
la(X, d, c)(x) =
{
d(x) ∧ c, x ∈ X,
d(x), x /∈ X.
We see that la is used to lower the security classes of the variables in X to the level of at most c. The semantics of
statements x := o(x1, . . . , xk) is deﬁned by
x := o(x1, . . . , xk)(d) = la({x1, . . . , xk, pc}, d[x → 1], d(x)).
That is, before the statement x := o(x1, . . . , xk) the variable x is dead hence the secrecy of its value is of no importance.
As the values of xi may inﬂuence the ﬁnal values of the variables, they cannot bemore secret than x is after the statement.
The same holds for implicit ﬂows through pc. The semantics of Boolean expressions is
o(x1, . . . , xk)t(d) = o(x1, . . . , xk)f(d) = la({x1, . . . , xk}, d, d(pc)).
At the beginning of a branching construct, the security classes of the variables xi of its guard o(x1, . . . , xk) should be
lowered to the level of security classes that the variables assigned to in the branches have at the end of the branching
construct. The meet of these security classes is collected into d(pc). We do not want to collect anything more into
d(pc), for example the security classes of variables that are assigned to after the end of the branching construct. Hence
we let the branch-function reset the security class of pc. We deﬁne branch(d) = d[pc → 1]. The security class of pc
has to be restored afterwards, so we put combine(d, d ′) = d ′[pc → d(pc) ∧ d ′(pc)]. Recall that d was the abstract
value at the incoming edge of the corresponding branch-node (in the inverse control-ﬂow graph).
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Fig. 8. Type system from backward information ﬂow analysis.
The type system derived from this analysis is given in Fig. 8. But again we have simpliﬁed some of the rules. If we
had followed Fig. 4 literally, then the rule for while-statements would have been
> P : d ′ −→ d ′[xi → d ′(xi) ∧ d ′(pc)]ki=1  d[pc → 1]
> while o(x1, . . . , xk) do P : d ′[xi → d ′(xi) ∧ d ′(pc)]ki=1  d −→ d
.
(6)
Indeed, if d(pc) = 1 (as set by branch) then bf(d) = d. In the conclusion of the rule, the application of combine
undoes the setting of d(pc) to 1. We modify this rule by denoting d ′[xi → d ′(xi) ∧ d ′(pc)]ki=1 by d ′, giving us
> P : d ′ −→ d ′  d[pc → 1] ∀ i : d ′(xi)d ′(pc)
> while o(x1, . . . , xk) do P : d ′  d −→ d
.
(7)
The new d ′ cannot be completely arbitrary—d ′(xi) must be smaller or equal to d ′(pc). This side condition is added to
the rule. The original d ′ is then just something that is larger than the new d ′. As the original d ′ only occurs on the left
side of the arrow in the premise we can safely replace it with the new d ′. Abbreviate d ′′ = d ′[xi → d ′(xi)∧d ′(pc)]ki=1,
then d ′′  d ′ and ∀i : d ′′(xi)d ′′(pc). We can derive (7) from (6) by
∀ i : d ′(xi)d ′(pc)
d ′ = d ′′
> P : d ′ −→ d ′  d[pc → 1]
∀ i : d ′(xi)d ′(pc)
d ′ = d ′′
> P : d ′ −→ d ′′  d[pc → 1] (sub)
> while o(x1, . . . , xk) do P : d ′′  d −→ d (6)
> while o(x1, . . . , xk) do P : d ′  d −→ d (sub)
and (6) from (7) by
d ′′  d ′ > P : d ′ −→ d ′′  d[pc → 1]
> P : d ′′ −→ d ′′  d[pc → 1] (sub) ∀i : d ′′(xi)d ′′(pc)
> while o(x1, . . . , xk) do P : d ′′  d −→ d .(7)
We further modify (7) by denoting d ′ d[pc → 1] by d ′. This gives us the rule (while) in Fig. 8. Now we also require
that the new d ′ is smaller or equal to d[pc → 1]. Abbreviate d∗ = d ′  d[pc → 1], d† = d ′[pc → d ′(pc) ∧ d(pc)]
and d‡ = d∗[pc → d∗(pc) ∧ d(pc)]. We can derive (while) from (7) by
d ′  d[pc → 1]
d† = d ′  d
> P : d ′ −→ d ′
d ′  d[pc → 1]
d ′ = d∗
> P : d ′ −→ d∗ (sub) ∀ i : d ′(xi)d ′(pc)
> while o(x1, . . . , xk) do P : d ′  d −→ d (7)
> while o(x1, . . . , xk) do P : d† −→ d
(sub)
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Fig. 9. “Type system” from standard weakest precondition calculus (= Hoare logic).
and (7) from (while) by
d ′  d = d‡
d∗  d ′ > P : d ′ −→ d∗
> P : d∗ −→ d∗ (sub)
∀ xi : d ′(xi)d ′(pc)
∀xi : d∗(x1)d∗(pc) d∗  d[pc → 1]
> while o(x1, . . . , xk) do P : d‡ −→ d
(while)
> while o(x1, . . . , xk) do P : d ′  d −→ d (sub).
Also, according to Fig. 4 the rule (if) should have been
> P1 : d ′ −→ d[pc → 1] > P2 : d ′ −→ d[pc → 1]
> if o(x1, . . . , xk) then P1 else P2 :
d ′[xi → d ′(xi) ∧ d ′(pc)]ki=1[pc → d(pc) ∧ d ′(pc)] −→ d
.
(8)
Here we denote d ′[xi → d ′(xi) ∧ d ′(pc)]ki=1[pc → d(pc) ∧ d ′(pc)] by d ′, this gives us the rule (if) in Fig. 8.
We have to add the conditions d ′(xi)d ′(pc)d(pc) for the new d ′, because for the original d ′, these conditions held
for d ′[xi → d ′(xi) ∧ d ′(pc)]ki=1[pc → d(pc) ∧ d ′(pc)]. The mutual derivability of (if) and (8) is obvious.
4.5. Hoare logic
Hoare logic can be derived as a “type system” according to our method from the following backward analysis
(essentially a weakest precondition calculus). We deﬁne D to be the set of all predicates on states, i.e., D = (Var →
Z) → B and  to be pointwise implication, so   	 iff s implies 	s for any state s. We deﬁne x := a =
s.(s[x → as]), bt = s.bs ⇒ s, bf = s.¬bs ⇒ s, branch() = , combine(,′) = ′.
We get that P >(	) = wp(	) where wp means the weakest precondition in the conventional sense. The corre-
sponding “type system” is presented in Fig. 9, which is deductively equivalent to the standard formulation of Hoare
logic.
It is also possible to derive a formulation of Hoare logic from a forward analysis (a strongest postcondition calculus).
We refrain from presenting the details here.
5. Certiﬁcation and checking of typings
In this section, we describe how to convince another party that a program P has a given type d1 −→ d2. We assume
that we know a type derivation Twith the root ? P : d1 −→ d2 (we concentrate on the type system in Fig. 3, the system
in Fig. 4 is handled similarly). The checker only has to compare types and compute primitive semantic functions.
The certiﬁcate (proof) for ? P : d1 −→ d2 has the form (d1,P(P, T , d1), d2) with an easily constructible
P(P, T , d1) ∈ D∗. The function P is deﬁned in Fig. 10.
Let us now describe the checking (veriﬁcation) algorithmV. It takes as arguments a program P, an abstract state d ′1
and a certiﬁcate p ∈ D∗ and either fails or returns an abstract state d ′2 and p′ ∈ D∗. Failure implies that the proof is
not accepted. To verify the proof (d1, p, d2) for the program P, one invokes V(P, d1, p), receives (d ′2, p′) and accepts
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Fig. 10. Certiﬁcate for ? P : d1 −→ d2 with type inference tree T.
Fig. 11. The checking algorithmV(P, d, p).
if d ′2  d2. The function V is deﬁned in Fig. 11. Here check checks that its argument is true, and fails otherwise.
The function head also fails on empty input.
Lemma 9. If d1, d ′1 ∈ D and p is such that d1  d ′1 and V(P, d1, p) = (d2, p′) for some d2 ∈ D and p′ then also
V(P, d ′1, p) = (d ′2, p′) for some d ′2  d2.
Proof. Induction over the call tree of V. If the invocation of V makes no further calls to V then P is a primitive
statement p and d2 = p(d1), d ′2 = p(d ′1); d ′2  d2 because of the monotonicity of p. If further calls to V are
made then the arguments to these calls are computed monotonically from the value of d. Hence the results of these
calls are also monotonic with respect to d. If the program P is a while-loop then V contains some checks whether a
value d ′ read from the proof p is larger than d or some value computed monotonically from d. If these checks pass then
they pass also if d is made smaller. The right component of the return value of V is just the “unconsumed” part of the
proof p, it does not depend on d. 
Theorem 10. If ? P : d1 −→ d2 is derivable and T is the corresponding derivation, then the invocation of
V(P, d1,P(P, T , d1) · p′) does not fail for any p′, and it returns a pair of the form (d ′2, p′) where d ′2  d2.
Proof. Let p = P(P, T , d1). Induction over the structure of the inference tree T. Consider the last applied rule R.
If R is (sub) then V(P, d1, p) = V(P, d ′1, p · p′) for some d ′1  d1 and the claim of the theorem follows from the
induction assumption and Lemma 9. If R is (prim) then V always succeeds, does not consume any part of the proof,
and returns p(d1) which is less than or equal to d2 by Theorem 7. If R is (seq) and P is P1;P2 then V is ﬁrst
invoked on P1; by the induction assumption, this invocation consumes precisely the preﬁx P(P1, T ′1, d1) of the proof
and returns an abstract value d ′′ ∈ D, such that d ′′  d ′, ? P2 : d ′ −→ d2 and T ′2 is the corresponding inference
tree. Afterwards V is invoked on P2 and the invocation consumes the preﬁx P(P1, T ′2, d ′), succeeds and returns an
abstract value d ′2  d2 by the induction assumption and Lemma 9. Similarly, if R is (if) and P is if b then P1 else P2
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then the invocation of V on P1 consumes precisely the preﬁx P(P1, T ′1, bt(d1)) and the following invocation of V
on P2 consumes precisely the preﬁxP(P2, T ′2, bf(d1)) of the rest. This invocations return the abstract values dˆ1 and
dˆ2 that are both less than or equal to some d ′, such that combine(d1, d ′)  d2. Hence V returns a value d ′2  d2. If R
is (while) and P is while b do P1 then the ﬁrst element d ′ of the proof must be such, that d ′  d (by the construction of
P(P, T , d1)) and ? P1 : bt(d ′) −→ d ′. By induction assumption, invocation of V on P1 succeeds, consumes the
preﬁxP(P1, T ′, bt(d ′)) of the proof, and returns some value that is less than or equal to d ′. Hence the second check
in V succeeds as well. The invocation of V returns combine(d, bf(d ′)) which is equal to d2. 
Theorem 11. If p is such that V(P, d1, p) = (d2, p′), then ? P : d1 −→ d2.
Proof. We use the proof p to construct an inference tree for ? P : d1 −→ d2. The construction proceeds by induction
over the structure ofP. IfP is a primitive statementp thenVon inputP andd1 returnsd2 = p(d1) and? P : d1 −→ d2
can be inferred with the rule (prim). If P is P1;P2 thenV is successfully invoked on P1 and d1, returning d ′; and then
on P2 and d ′, returning d2. By the induction assumption, ? P1 : d1 −→ d ′ and ? P2 : d ′ −→ d2 can be inferred, and
a further application of the rule (seq) completes the inference of ? P : d1 −→ d2. If P is if b then P1 else P2 thenV is
successfully invoked on P1 and bt(d1), returning d ′1; and then on P2 and bf(d1), returning d ′2. The value d2 is equal
to combine(d1, d ′1 unionsq d ′2). By induction assumption, we can infer ? P1 : bt(d1) −→ d ′1 and ? P2 : bf(d1) −→ d ′2.
An application of the rule (if) completes the inference of ? P : d1 −→ d2. If P is while b do P1 then the ﬁrst value
d ′ in p must be greater or equal to d1. When V is invoked on P1 and bt(d1), it returns some d ′′  d ′, because the
second check must also succeed. By induction assumption, ? P1 : bt(d ′) −→ d ′′ can be inferred. We can now use
the rule (sub) to infer ? P1 : bt(d ′) −→ d ′ and the rule (while) to infer ? P : d1 −→ d2. 
The checking algorithmV actually “reads” the certiﬁcate p only if it encounters a while-loop in the program. It must
remember the value d ′ as long as it veriﬁes the loop body because the value of d ′ is used in a check after that. If space
at the checking device is at premium then the proof may repeat the loop invariant d ′ after the proof for the loop body,
i.e. we deﬁne P(while b do P1, T , d1) = d ′ ·P(P1, T ′, bt(d ′)) · d ′ for the (while)-rule and as P for other rules.
Now V no longer has to store d ′ while it veriﬁes the loop body. But P may cheat—it may make the two copies of
d ′ different. To avoid this we let V store a cryptographic message digest of the ﬁrst copy of d ′ and compare it to the
second copy. Although such solution does not eliminate the storage requirements completely, it considerably reduces
them—a digest will typically require 160–256 bits [20], considerably less than the entire d ′.
Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k be a collision-resistant hash function where k is typically 160 or 256 (as the arguments of
H are arbitrary bit-strings, we assume that H can be applied to anything representable). Intuitively (see [21] for precise
deﬁnitions) this means that it is very hard to ﬁnd collisions for H—pairs (x1, x2) where x1 = x2 but H(x1) = H(x2).
Let VH (while b do P1, d, p) denote the algorithm
d ′ ← head(p); check(d ′  branch(d));h ← H(d ′);
(d ′′, p′) ← VH (P1, bt(d ′), tail(p)); d¯ ← head(p′); check(h = H(d¯));
check(d ′′  d¯); return(combine(d, bf(d¯)), tail(p′))
and letVH be deﬁned likeV for other programs. Using more advanced integrity structures (authenticated search trees
[5]), the space requirement per loop may be decreased even more (to the size of a single identiﬁer, 2 or 4 bytes).
Theorem 12. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm K such that, if p, P and d1 are such that VH (P, d1, p) = d2
but  ? P : d1 −→ d2 then KH(P, d1, p) outputs a collision for H.
Proof. The algorithm K executes bothV(P, d1, p) (ignoring the second copy of loop invariants) andVH (P, d1, p) in
a lock-step fashion up to the point where the data that they are accessing at this point differs for the ﬁrst time. A step
in either V or VH is either a further call to V or VH , a return-statement, or a check-statement, except the statement
check(h = H(d¯)). This statement, as well as the computation of h or reading the ﬁrst element of p do not constitute
as separate steps, they are grouped with the following statement. We see that the only points whereV andVH actually
access different variables are at the end of handling the programs of the form while b do P1. Namely, in two last
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statements V makes use of the variable d ′ while VH uses d¯. Also, the ﬁrst difference in the executions of cannot be
the return-statement of that case, because if d ′ = d¯ then this is discovered already at the point where V executed
check(d ′′  d ′) andVH executed check(d ′′  d¯). If K stops the execution ofV andVH at a point where d ′ = bard ,
but the statement check(h = H(d¯)) succeeded, then it has found two differing values—d ′ and d¯—that are mapped to
the same bit-string by H. The algorithm K outputs the pair (d ′, d¯). 
6. Related work
Previous work on relating program analyses and type systems has focused on control-ﬂow analyses (analyses that
attempt to show that the program does not make an illegal step) [17,8,18,3]. These type systems have a more complex
structure than the ones considered here and typically feature universally and existentially quantiﬁed implications (big
meets and joins of implications). The type of a program fragment can contain as much information as the denotational
abstract semantics of that fragment. In contrast, a type in our type system corresponds to just one point (pair of abstract
states) in the graph of the abstract semantics.
The closest to our work is probably the work of Naik and Palsberg [13]. They consider the same language as we do
and their abstract semantics can be cast in our terms as well. But they only consider the case where the underlying lattice
D is a powerset (and they do not consider branch and combine functions). And similarly to the systems mentioned
above, they employ quantiﬁed implications and a type again corresponds to the entire semantics.
The certiﬁcation of typing of Section 5 is reminiscent of Necula’s and Lee’s proof-carrying code [14]. Whereas the
preliminary versions included the whole proof (derivation tree) in the certiﬁcate, later work [15] has concentrated on
including only the information that is expensive to determine; this is similar to only including some typing information
for loops. The same approach is present in the lightweight bytecode veriﬁcation of Rose [19]—a control-ﬂow graph-
based approach where the labels of all back-edges are included in the certiﬁcate. An implementation and soundness and
completeness proofs of this approach are given in [10]. The abstraction-carrying code of Albert et al. [1] is promoting
exactly the same idea, to make checking the result of a static program analysis easy by shipping the program together
with a certiﬁcate containing the essential information.
The type systems for secure information ﬂow presented in this paper are similar in their spirit to those of Andrews
and Reitman [4] (a logic, really) and Amtoft and Banerjee [2] and more precise than those by Volpano et al. [22]. The
reason is that, for us, a type is a pair of security class assignments to variables (corresponding to their security classes
before and after a program run), while Volpano et al. insist (for reasons that escape us) that security classes of variables
are invariant. During the revision of this paper we learned that a secure information ﬂow type system very similar to
ours has also been proposed recently by Hunt and Sands [9]. But their work does not describe any general method for
obtaining type systems for data-ﬂow analyses.
7. Conclusions and future work
We have shown how imperative data-ﬂow analyses deﬁnable in a certain framework can be equivalently cast as type
systems, proceeding from a very basic idea about what a type of an imperative program ought to be. The resulting type
systems are, to our judgement, extremely intuitive and well-motivated, so we believe we have once more witnessed
how useful it can be to have the basic concepts right in any theory. We also believe that our type systems are practically
applicable in certiﬁed software.
As future work, we plan to further explore the limits of our analysis framework (especially the applications of
branch and combine functions) and to see if the framework can be liberalized in interesting ways while keeping the
type systems simple. We also plan to study systematic description of data-ﬂow analyses in terms of logics. Yet another
direction will be type systems corresponding to analyses for a language with procedures. Here we hope to be able to
reuse the main idea of the standard Hoare logic treatment of procedures.
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